

in support of such belief. But on this question he allows himself only a few words. Having undertaken to give only M. Bergson's own views, he feels he has no right to lay stress on a subject on which M. Bergson has not yet written.

As a sympathetic commentary on this new philosophy M. Le Roy's book is admirable, but it suffers inevitably from the very thing which makes its value. For those who already sympathize, at least in part, with M. Bergson's views, it adds fresh insight, and the meaning is clear. It is likely, however, to strike less favorably those who have not yet accustomed their minds to the new point of view. If they look for a perfectly clear cut use of terms according to rigidly fixed definitions, they will be disappointed (and in that case probably disgusted also). Perhaps this is inevitable. The claim of this new method of thought to supersede the formal use of concepts in favor of language, which creates new ones to express new intuitions as it goes, is the very thing its opponents are least ready to admit.

Over one very important point, however, critics would have a right to complain. M. Le Roy does not give anywhere in this book a satisfactory account of M. Bergson's theory of Time. The question of Time is so fundamental that its omission must certainly be admitted to be a serious defect in a book otherwise deserving nothing but praise.

London, England.

KARIN COSTELLOE.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. By H. Wilson Carr, D.Litt. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. Pp. 93. The People's Books Series.

This little book is the second contributed by Mr. Carr to the series called 'The People's Books.' It is meant to convey to non-specialists some idea of the problems of epistemology, and in this I think it should succeed; though it is a little difficult to be sure whether what is quite intelligible to one who is familiar with these questions will be equally clear to those who are now meeting them for the first time.

Mr. Carr takes over Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description and says that the problem of truth and error only concerns the latter. This is rather too sweeping. The problem applies to all propositions, and the fact that when a proposition is founded purely on knowl-

edge by acquaintance, as *e. g.*, '2 is less than 3,' it is liable to be self-evidently true, is no ground for denying that the question: What is meant by truth? is applicable to it. I do not know either why Mr. Carr, after carefully distinguishing sense-data with which we are acquainted from independent reality which we infer from them, should say on page 19 that "all reality whatever is composed of sense-experience."

Mr. Carr goes on to deal with the view that truth means agreement with reality. This, he says, must be true in some sense, but the question is in what sense. He rejects the view that the correspondence can take the form of copying on the ground that to know whether a copy is good or bad you must know both the copy and the thing copied. Whilst I agree with his rejection of the copying theory, I think this particular argument rests on confusing the *meaning* of truth with a *test* for it. His argument only shows that if copying be the meaning of truth, it will give us no test for the truth of any proposition. But this does not prove that copying is not the meaning of truth; there is no reason why a knowledge of truth's meaning should supply a test of its presence. A better argument of Mr. Carr's is that ideas are acts of knowing realities, and, as such, psychical; and therefore not copies of those realities which are often physical. Nevertheless, a case could be made out for correspondence of a kind between the sense-data that are the objects of ideas and the realities which are inferred from them and are only known by description. But obviously this would not cover the whole field of truth.

Mr. Carr next deals with the coherence theory of truth and introduces us to the Absolute as "the idea of an object which realizes perfect logical consistency." Our author has a good deal of sympathy with the arguments that lead to the Absolute because he accepts (as a good Bergsonian) the usual antinomies about space, time, and motion. He offers us a new antinomy about motion, *viz.*, that a body cannot move in a continuous medium: it cannot enter a filled space till the medium has left it whilst the medium will not be caused to leave it till the body has begun to move. I do not see why motion must be supposed to take place in jerks; why should not the two processes go on together, the liquid flowing out from the front of the body and circulating round it to fill up the space that it leaves at the same time as the body moves forward?

Mr. Carr comes to the startling conclusion that no purely logical objections can be made to the arguments for the Absolute and that the reason for rejecting the theory is that it fails to provide a criterion by which any particular proposition can be judged. He then gives us a very fairminded account of Pragmatism which claims to remedy this defect. Needless to say, he cannot make that tissue of confusions consistent with itself and with what we know ourselves to mean by truth. In the course of his argument, which seems to me quite sound, Mr. Carr introduces the Theory of Relativity and says that it shows that our former views about space and time were wrong. This is, I think, quite gratuitous. All that it shows us is that we have always been inclined to forget some of the implications of our practical methods of *measuring* lengths and durations.

In the seventh chapter on "Illusion" Mr. Carr gives us an account of Bergson. It does not seem to me to make that author any more plausible. No doubt the senses and the intellect are selective, but why should mere selection produce illusions like space and time? And what possible ground is there for supposing, that, because the intellect cannot deal with life, therefore the one reality (by making selections from which the intellect produces illusions) is life? And why should it be of more practical value to life to have illusions about itself than to have correct information? One more confusion is between the two propositions 'everything changes' and 'everything is change.' The former may very well be true; but it does not imply the latter, which still seems to me to be nonsense. And if both be true together, we have the still more nonsensical proposition 'change changes.'

In the last chapter the troublesome subject of error is considered. To meet the difficulty that the object of an erroneous judgment is certainly not nothing and yet is not real, two suggestions are offered. One is, I think, meant to be Mr. Russell's theory of judgment and the other is Prof. Stout's view about 'real possibilities.' If Russell's theory be meant, it appears in too simple a form to be plausible, for the reference to many-term relations is dropped, and this is essential. In quoting Meinong in connection with Prof. Stout's theory, it seems to me that Mr. Carr is under some confusion. He uses the word 'supposition' for what is supposed, whereas Meinong only used *Annahme* for the psychical act of supposing. And Mr. Carr seems to hold

that 'suppositions' in his sense differ from the objects of true judgment, whilst Meinong holds that the objects of *Annahmen* ('Objectives,' as he calls them) are the same as the objects of judgments. But it is possible that I may have misunderstood Mr. Carr here, for he is rather condensed, and it is doubtful whether his popular readers will make much of this eighth chap-

St. Andrew's University.

C. D. BROAD.

ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL:

A Contribution to the Phenomenology of the Thought Processes.

Thesis approved for the degree of doctor of science in the University of London. By Francis Aveling, Ph.D., D.Sc., D.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. x, 225.

Dr. Aveling's purpose is to discover what is in consciousness "when we think the universal or the individual." He accordingly devised experiments to produce the mental phenomena concerned. He arranged ten sets each of five pictures, which were displayed to his subjects one at a time, along with one of ten nonsense words, corresponding to the ten sets. For example, 'Ferod' was the word for pictures of boys running, leaping, etc. After each session in the learning-period, the words were exposed as stimuli, the subject reacting when "the meaning of the word appeared in consciousness in any form": introspections were then taken. After the learning-period, the words were given as the subjects of incomplete sentences, *e. g.*, "All Ferods are —," "The largest Sorab is —," etc. These were calculated to make the words "function as universals or individuals." The subjects had to complete the sentences, and introspections were taken. His main conclusions are as follows:

The words acquired meaning by an association process, where either a concept was abstracted from the objects or they were subsumed under a concept previously so obtained. This concept, which need not be accompanied by sensorial elements, when revived by the word gave it its meaning. Thinking always involves such concepts. When images occur, they give the concept stability. Images seem to be necessary in thinking an individual.

It is needless to show the connection of this with the work of such psychologists as Bühler, and all interested in this recent development of experimental psychology will appreciate